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Abstract
Using the Grossman and Yanagawa(1993) model, we investigate how large the social cost of
an asset bubble is. We show that if the utilities of all generations are evaluated almost
equally, the extent of its social cost is equivalent to imposing on all generations a wage
income tax whose rate is the ratio of the quantity of bubble asset to the total savings in the
balanced growth equilibrium.
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  What effects does the existence of an asset bubble have on the welfare 
aspect of the economy? An answer to this question was given by Tirole 
(1985). Using the neoclassical growth model with overlapping generations, 
he showed that an asset bubble can exist in equilibrium only when an 
economy without bubble is dynamically inefficient, and that the introduction 
of an asset bubble into such an economy can be Pareto improving because 
the bubble eliminates over-accumulation of capital. Accordingly, the 
existence of a bubble in equilibrium is desirable from the standpoint of 
welfare in the neoclassical growth model1. However, this conclusion no 
longer holds in the endogenous growth model. By introducing an asset 
bubble into the standard endogenous growth models, Grossman and 
Yanagawa (1993) demonstrated that the introduction improves the welfare 
of the initial old generation but harms the welfare of future generations, 
and that the former positive welfare effect is exceeded by the latter negative 
welfare effect. Therefore, in the framework of endogenous growth theory the 
net welfare effect of an asset bubble on the whole economy is negative. 
However, Grossman and Yanagawa (1993) do not examine how large the net 
welfare cost is2. 
  The purpose of this paper is to investigate the extent of the social cost of 
an asset bubble. Concretely, we compare the social welfare level of an 
economy with an asset bubble with that of an economy without a bubble 
asset but a wage income tax imposed on all generations, and calculate the 
social cost of the bubble in terms of the wage income tax rate. We show that 
if the utilities of all generations are evaluated almost equally, the extent of 
the social cost of the bubble is equivalent to imposing the tax whose rate is 
the ratio of the quantity of bubble asset (= ) to the total savings (= ) in 






2.  Model  and  result 
  The model we consider is basically identical to that of Grossman and 
                                                  
1  The same conclusion holds in the case of the exchange economy of Samuelson (1958) 
and Wallace (1980). 
2  Futagami and Shibata (1999) also study the welfare effects of the asset bubble in an 
endogenous growth model. They consider the case where the supply of the bubble asset 
is variable, and investigate which generation has the welfare gain (or loss) when the 
growth rate of the supply of bubble is changed. However, they too do not argue the 
 1Yanagawa (1993). Each generation lives for two periods, and we assume the 
population of each generation is one for simplicity. There are two methods of 
savings: physical capital and bubble asset, which is the intrinsically 
worthless paper asset. The representative household of generation   solves 
the following problem: 
t




t c 1 log + β 1 0 < < β 腪 
           s . t .   c  ,  c   t t t t
y
t w m p s = + + ] [ t t t t
o
t m p s r 1 1 1 ) 1 ( + + + + + =
where  β ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,   denote, respectively, subjective 
discount factor, young period consumption, old period consumption, labor 
income, return rate of physical capital, quantity of savings in physical 
capital, price of one unit of bubble asset in terms of goods, and quantity of 
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equilibrium, we can derive the following optimal plans for consumption and 
savings. 
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where    is the quantity of the total savings, namely  = + .  t S t S t s t tm p
   On the production side of the economy there are many identical firms 
behaving competitively, and the production function of the representative 
firm  j   is given by 
(3)      = , 
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t l j , physical capital 
employed by firm  j , aggregate capital stock, and labor force employed by 
firm  j , respectively. It is assumed that the production function exhibits 
constant returns to scale, that the functional form of labor productivity is 
, and that the total labor force supplied inelastically by 
households is one. Under these assumptions perfect competition yields   
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where   and  t K F F ∂ ∂ ≡ / 1 t tL A F F ∂ ∂ ≡ / 2 . 
                                                                                                                                                  
extent of the social cost of bubble. 
 2    The market equilibrium conditions of physical capital and bubble asset 
are given respectively by 
(5)       = ,    = 1  1 + t K t s t m
where we assume the aggregate nominal supply of bubble asset is one and is 
fixed over time. Let us define  t κ + 1 ≡ t t K K / 1 + ,  t B ≡ t tm p  and  , 
where 
t b ≡ t t K B /
t κ + 1 ,  and b  are gross economic growth rate, total real stock of 
bubble asset and real bubble-capital ratio. From (2), (4) and (5) the following 
dynamic equations of this economy can be obtained. 
t B t



















We can see from (6) that the growth rate of the economy with bubble is 






. In the balanced growth equilibrium, (6) can be rewritten as 
(7)     
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where 
b κ + 1  is the gross growth rate of the steady state with bubble. So, 
the positive bubble can exist in equilibrium only if the potential growth rate 
is higher than the interest rate: 
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Hereafter we assume this condition is satisfied. 
  From (2), (4) and (7) the consumption levels of generations –1 and   in 
the balanced growth equilibrium are   
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As we can see from (9) and (10), the existence of bubble improves the utility 
of generation –1 because the bubble asset can be sold to the next generation, 
but harms the utilities of future generations because it depresses the 
economic growth rate. So, how large is the social cost of bubble?  To 
examine this, we assume the existence of the following liner social welfare 
function: 
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where   is given by (1) and   is defined as  . From (9), (10) and 
(11) the social welfare level of the steady state with bubble W  can be 
calculated as 
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  Next, we consider an economy where there is no bubble asset and the 
wage income tax whose rate is τ  is imposed on all generations, and 
examine how large the social cost of the bubble is in terms of the wage 
income tax rate. In this case the optimization problem of the representative 
household of generation   is:   t
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Thus the optimal plans for consumption and savings are 
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The profit maximization conditions of the representative firm and the 
market equilibrium condition of physical capital are the same as before and 
are given by (4) and (5). So the economic growth rate and the consumption 
plans of generations –1 and t  on the balanced growth equilibrium are 
respectively 
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where 
τ κ + 1   denotes the gross economic growth rate of this case. Using (11), 
(15) and (16) we can calculate the social welfare level of this case as 
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Because  膄0 holds by (8), the tax rate  1 2 / x x τ  which equates W  with W  
satisfies the following relationship according to the sign of 
b τ
X . 
(19)   τ 膄0  if  X 膃0,    τ 膁0  if  X 膁0 ,     τ 膃0  if  X 膄0 
Relationship (19) means that the asset bubble harms (improves) the social 
welfare if  X 膃0 ( X 膄0) holds. For example, suppose ψ 膁菀, which means 
that the discount factor of the next generation’s utility in the social welfare 
function is equal to the individual subjective discount factor in the utility 







, so the asset 
bubble harms social welfare if  β 膄1  holds.   3 /
  The most realistic case is that of ψ 臠艐, where the utilities of all 
generations are evaluated almost equally. In this case the value of  X  
satisfies  X 臠腼1, so the existence of the asset bubble necessarily harms the 
social welfare. Using (2), (4) and (7) we can calculate the extent of the social 
cost in terms of the wage income tax rate as   
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This means that if the utilities of all generations are evaluated almost 
equally, the extent of the social cost of the bubble is equivalent to imposing 
the wage income tax whose rate is the ratio of the quantity of bubble asset 
 to the total savings  . Therefore, in the Grossman and Yanagawa-type 
endogenous growth model, the larger the size of the bubble in the balanced 
growth equilibrium is, the more serious the social cost of the bubble. 
t B t S
How should we interpret this result more concretely? Suppose an economy 
where the prices of all existing stocks are continuously above their 
fundamental values by 5%, which roughly corresponds to the case where 
 5t t S B /   in our model is 5%. In such an economy the larger amount of national 
savings is allocated to the purchase of existing bubbly stocks and therefore 
the amount of national savings allocated to the new investment projects 
(namely, newly issued stocks) is inevitably lowered. The results obtained 
here show that in such a case the social cost is equivalent to imposing on all 
generations a 5% wage income tax. 
 
3.  Final  Remarks 
  In this paper we showed that if the utilities of all generations are 
evaluated almost equally the social cost of the stationary bubble in the 
Grossman and Yanagawa (1993) model is equivalent to imposing on all 
generations a wage income tax whose rate is equal to  . Note that this 
conclusion holds true only in the Grossman and Yanagawa model and 
different conclusions can be obtained if different formulations of the model 
are supposed.   
t t S B /
  The reason for the social cost of the bubble arising in the Grossman and 
Yanagawa model is that the bubble crowds out investment for physical 
capital and lowers the growth rate in the balanced growth path. Recently, 
some authors have proposed models where the bubble can promote economic 
growth through stimulating investment activities. For example, Olivier 
(2000) developed a model where the bubble on the market value of R&D 
firms encourages R&D activities and raises the growth rate of the economy 
measured by the speed of the increase in the variety of consumption goods. 
Ventura (2003) constructs a simple model where entrepreneurs can create 
bubbly firms and shareholders buy them for the purpose of saving, and 
shows that the creation of bubbly firms can stimulate capital accumulation 
when the financial market is imperfect, in the sense that shareholders must 
pay the monitoring cost because of the informational asymmetry. In such 
models the existence of the bubble can improve the welfare of the economy 
and brings about social benefit. Examining how large the social benefit of 
the bubble is in such models is a question for future research. 
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